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OFFENDERS WITH A MENTAL IMPAIRMENT UNDER A ‘FUSION LAW’: 






A common criticism of a ‘fusion law’ - a generic law covering all instances where 
a person’s ability to make a treatment decision is impaired, regardless of the 
cause, and furthermore which only allows non-consensual treatment if it is in 
the person’s ‘best interests’ – is that it fails to deal adequately with the 
protection of the public. This paper examines the implications of a ‘fusion law’ 
where a person with an ‘impairment or disturbance of mental functioning’ has 
committed an offence or where the person has been found ‘unfit to plead’ or 
‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. It is argued that within the parameters of a 
fusion law, unfair discrimination towards those with a mental impairment 
placed on treatment orders by a court - as exists presently in nearly all 
jurisdictions - can be avoided while at the same time providing satisfactory 
public protection. This can be achieved through hospital treatment, voluntary 
or involuntary depending on the person’s decision-making ability and best 
interests (or best interpretation of ‘will and preferences’), and a form of 
supervision order in the community that is supportively structured, but includes 




The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of a ‘fusion law’1 for the 
management of offenders with an ‘impairment or disturbance of mental 
functioning’, regardless of its cause. As the fusion law, a generic law applicable 
to all patients in all medical specialties, is based on a ‘decision-making capacity’ 
model, most of the discussion would apply also to a separate ‘capacity’-based 
‘mental health’ law.2 
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The arguments for a fusion law are readily available elsewhere. In essence, the 
fusion law aims to eliminate discrimination in the law against people with a 
diagnosis of a ‘mental disorder’ when it comes to non-consensual treatment. 
Under current legal arrangements, the autonomy or right to self-determination 
of those with a mental disorder is not accorded the same respect as it is for all 
other patients, when those with a mental disorder who retain the ability, or 
capacity, to make treatment decisions can nevertheless be treated involuntarily, 
while those with a physical disorder cannot. A second form of discrimination 
against persons with a mental disorder is their liability to preventive detention 
and treatment (albeit usually in a hospital) based solely on their purported risk 
of harm to others, and not, like the rest of the population, to their having 
committed an offence (or being strongly suspected of having done so). A fusion 
law, by applying the same justifications for involuntary treatment to all persons, 
regardless of medical specialty, eliminates these forms of discrimination. 
 
A number of criticisms of the fusion law proposal have been raised, but the one 
probably generating most apprehension concerns the implications for the 
management of people with a mental disorder who present a significant risk of 
violence to others. Daw, for example, provides a good account of the 
prominence in the UK of public protection concerns during debates on reform 
of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983) in response to proposals that some 
form of capacity-based criterion should be included in the justification for 
involuntary treatment.3 Inclusion of such a criterion was supported by the 
Richardson Expert Committee4 set up by the government to review the MHA 
1983, by a number of stakeholders’ (including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
the British Psychological Society, Mind) as well as in parliamentary 
recommendations from the Joint Scrutiny Committee, the House of Lords, and 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights.5  
 
Governmental responses were strongly against this proposal. Rosie Winterton, 
Minister of State for Health Services stated: “every restriction was a patient not 
treated” and warned:  
 
of the good – and a ‘preference’ – a wish, desire or intention expressed in the present. The 
greater the risk to the person’s ‘will’ from acting on a ‘preference’ that contradicts that ‘will’ the 
stronger is the justification for an intervention. The object of the intervention is to support the 
person in giving effect to their ‘will’. Such an intervention may, if all reasonable efforts at 
supported decision-making prove unsuccessful, lead to ‘involuntary’ treatment – in fact, 
supporting the ‘will’ (voluntas) rather against the ‘will’. ‘Best interests’ in this sense is giving 
effect to the person’s ‘will’. The making of an advance directive is a good model – it asks that 
the ‘will’ of the maker should be respected if a situation should arise in the future where the 
person becomes unable to express that ‘will’ and instead may express a ‘preference’ 
inconsistent with that ‘will’. The person asks that ‘preference’ not be respected. I will use the 
terms ‘decision-making capacity’ and ‘best interests’ in this paper but ask the reader to bear in 
mind how their interpretation may change. Alternative terms might be ‘treatment decision-
making ability’ and ‘will and preferences’. 
3 Daw R. The Mental Health Act 2007: the defeat of an ideal. J Mental Health Law. Nov 
2007;131-148. 
4 Expert Committee (1999) Review of the Mental Health Act 1983, Dept of Health, Nov. 1999.  
5 Supra Note 3 




“… if it cannot be shown that a patient’s judgment is impaired, they cannot be detained 
– regardless of how much the patient needs treatment and however much they, and 
others, are at risk without it.”6  
 
In the Government’s response to the Joint Scrutiny Committee it stated: 
 
“… In the Government’s opinion, it is not safe to assume that there is a link between the 
severity of a condition – and therefore the need for treatment – and the person’s ability 
to make decisions. It is possible that people who are at very great risk to themselves or 
others would nonetheless retain the ability to make unimpaired decisions about their 
treatment.”7 
 
An echo of the same concerns is repeated in the 2018 Final Report of the 
Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983.8 Despite suggesting that a 
fusion law is currently the most promising direction of travel for the future, a 
number of ‘tests’ are proposed that such a law would need to pass. One is a 
‘public interest’ test:  
 
“The final confidence test is whether fusion law can take proper account of what is in 
the public interest, particularly when it comes to the risk of harm to others. We have 
considerable reservations as to whether the concept of ‘best interests’ can work in this 
respect. We think at this stage that necessity and proportionality are likely to be more 
appropriate assessments.”9   
 
II. ANOTHER FORM OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
The discrimination against people with a mental disorder noted above concerns 
the failure to accord to them the same respect for autonomy as is accorded all 
other categories of patient. I propose there is a second form of discrimination, 
one that is evident in the forensic domain. Offenders with a diagnosis of a 
mental disorder may be subject to deprivations and restrictions of liberty for 
periods far in excess of those imposed on ‘normal’ (or ‘non-disordered’) 
offenders who have committed a similar offence with a similar level of 
seriousness.  
 
In England and Wales, for example, under the Mental Health Act an offender 
with a mental disorder, following conviction, may be placed by the court on a 
hospital order (s.37) that, with renewals, is potentially indeterminate (though 
subject to appeal to a Mental Health Tribunal after 6 months, and once per 
year thereafter). In cases where it is deemed to be necessary for the protection 
of the public from serious harm, the hospital order may have a restriction order 
attached (s.37/41). This requires an authorisation by the Ministry of Justice for 
absolute discharge from hospital, which occurs rarely, or for a conditional 
 
6 Rt. Hon Rosie Winterton MP Local Government Association Conference, Mental Health Bill, 1 
March 2007.  
7 Government response to the report of the Joint Committee on the draft Mental Health Bill 
2004. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Health, July 2005. 
8 Modernising the Mental Health Act. Final report of the Independent Review of the Mental 
Health Act 1983. GOV.UK, 2018 
9 Ibid, page 227.  
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discharge to the community where the person is liable to recall if the person is 
thought again to pose a risk to themselves or others as a result of their mental 
disorder. An absolute discharge from conditional discharge again requires 
Ministry of Justice authorisation. Alternatively, discharge may occur via a Mental 
Health Tribunal. Again such a discharge is nearly always conditional; a later 
appeal may result in an absolute discharge. 
 
III. VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER 
 
Behind the concerns about whether a fusion law would fall short in protecting 
the public lies a stereotype that people with a mental disorder are intrinsically 
dangerous, especially those with a psychosis and thus apparently wildly 
irrational. This is presumably why mental health laws in the vast majority of 
jurisdictions couple the risk to others with the risk to the person themselves in 
the risk criterion supporting involuntary detention. 
 
To what extent is that stereotype justified? Population studies show that people 
with a severe mental illness – a psychotic illness or an affective disorder, in the 
absence of drug or alcohol abuse or an antisocial personality disorder – are 
modestly, if at all, more likely to be violent than the rest of the population.10 
Drugs or alcohol are especially associated with violent offences, whether with 
or without a mental illness. A meta-analysis of studies examining violence in 
schizophrenia found that those with this diagnosis were no more likely to 
commit a violent offence when abusing substances than those without a mental 
disorder who abused substances.11 
 
In England and Wales in 2004 1.6% of serious violent offences were 
perpetrated by persons known to have had contact with mental health services 
within the previous 12 months and who had a diagnosis of schizophrenia (or 
other delusional disorder) or an affective disorder. Eighty-five percent of those 
in this category, with schizophrenia, had also misused or were dependent on 
drugs or alcohol at the time.12 The frequency of persons with such a mental 
illness among those who carried out a homicide was found to be higher, 3.5%. 
In 54% of these, drug or alcohol misuse was also present.  
 
 
10 The risk of violence for those with a mental illness, in the absence of drug or alcohol misuse 
or antisocial personality, is only modestly, if at all higher than for the rest of the population. 
[Coid J, et al. Violence and psychiatric morbidity in a national household population--a report 
from the British Household Survey. Am J Epidemiology. 2006;164:1199-1208; Elbogen EB, 
Johnson SC. The intricate link between violence and mental disorder: results from the National 
Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions. Archives Gen Psychiat. 2009;66:152-
161; Fazel S, Lichtenstein P, Grann, et al. Bipolar disorder and violent crime: New evidence 
from population-based longitudinal studies and systematic review. JAMA Psychiatry 
2010;67:931-938]. 
11 Fazel S, Gulati G, Linsell L, et al. Schizophrenia and violence: systematic review and meta-
analysis. Plos Medicine. 2009; https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000120 
12 Flynn S, Rodway C, Appleby L, Shaw J. Serious violence by people with mental illness: 
national clinical survey. J Interpersonal Violence 2014;29:1438-1458 
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A report on mental illness and homicide in England covering 2005 to 2015 found 
6% of perpetrators (an average of 32 per year) had a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Of these, 61% were known to mental health services, while 88% 
also had a history of alcohol or drug misuse. Thirty-six percent with this 
diagnosis had an abnormal mental state at the time of the offence; 34% were 
convicted of murder; and 41% received a custodial sentence.13 
 
A rarely cited Home Office Statistical Bulletin in 2006 reported on the 
experiences of victims of violent crime who were interviewed as part of the 
British Crime Survey. Three years, between 2002 and 2005, were covered. 
Victims who had experienced a violent incident were asked why they thought 
the incident happened. ‘The offender was suffering from a mental illness’ was 
given as the reason in 1%, 2% and 1%, of all violent incidents, per respective 
year.14  
 
These data indicate that fears of violence caused by people with a severe 
mental illness are grossly unrealistic and are underlined by a seductive 
prejudicial stereotype of dangerousness. 
 
IV. FORENSIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FUSION LAW - PRINCIPLES 
 
Central to a fusion law is the principle that involuntary detention or treatment 
is only justified when a person with an impairment or disturbance in the 
functioning of mind lacks treatment decision-making capacity and the 
intervention is in the person’s best interests.15 I am using the terms ‘impairment 
or disturbance in the functioning of mind’ and not ‘mental disorder’ to make it 
 
13  National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide. Annual Report 2017. 
https://www.hqip.org.uk/resource/national-confidential-inquiry-into-suicide-and-homicide-
annual-report-2017/  
14 Coleman K, Hird C, Povey D. Violent crime overview, Homicide and Gun Crime 2004/2005. 
2nd Edition (Supplementary Volume to Crime in England and Wales 2004/2005), Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin 2006 
15 An assessment of the ‘best interests’ of a person does not mean that the well-being of third 
parties is necessarily excluded. For example, if violence against another person is threatened 
by a person who is currently mentally ill and lacking decision-making capacity, this might be 
inconsistent with the best interests of the ill person. An example would be where the ill person, 
when well, deeply values their relationship with the threatened person (for example, a close 
relative or friend). Causing serious physical or psychological harm would be contrary to the ill 
person’s normal commitments to the victim. Following recovery, such harms are likely to be 
regretted by the ill person and seen by that person as having been caused when not ‘really 
being himself or herself’, or as being opposed to the person’s deeply held values. Acting to 
prevent a risk of violence to unspecified persons, if inconsistent with the person’s deeply held 
beliefs and values, such as the unacceptability of violence, would again be in the subjective 
‘best interests’ of the person. (A consistency of values, on the other hand, would in these terms 
suggest antisocial behaviour without an impairment of decision-making capacity). Another 
example would be a person admitted to hospital involuntarily for treatment in their best 
interests who becomes violent to other patients. Proportionate measures taken to prevent such 
violence would be justified as cessation of treatment would not be in the person’s best interests. 
In a similar vein, violent acts that are radically contrary to a person’s deep beliefs, values or 
commitments are proposed by Tadros to best define an attribution of ‘not guilty by reason of 
insanity’ (Tadros V. Criminal Responsibility Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2005) 
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clear that in a fusion law the impairment is not restricted to those who have a 
diagnosis of a psychiatric or ‘mental disorder’; it can result from any disease or 
disorder. As a shorthand I will use the term ‘impairment of mind’. The 
interpretations of decision-making capacity and best interests are evolving, with 
a growing regard, at least in some jurisdictions, being given to a respect for 
the person’s beliefs and values (or ‘will and preferences’). Details will not be 
discussed here; they are readily available elsewhere.16 The essential principle I 
am advocating is that a hospital order made by a court should not authorise 
involuntary treatment if an offender retains decision-making capacity. 
Voluntary treatment would be the only option for such a person.  
 
A second principle follows from the need to eliminate discrimination against 
offenders with an impairment of mind when compared to non-disordered 
offenders convicted of a similar offence with a similar level of seriousness 
(based, for example, on the degrees of harm and culpability). The management 
of those with a mental impairment should be, as far as possible, on an equal 
basis with other offenders. Most importantly, the total duration of a deprivation 
of liberty (in hospital or prison) or a restriction of liberty (following discharge 
to the community) imposed by a sentence or court order for an offender with 
an impairment of mind should be no longer than that imposed on a non-
disordered offender. Depending on the response to treatment, where provided, 
it may indeed be shorter. 
 
Northern Ireland is the first country to pass a form of fusion law (Mental 
Capacity Act, 2016).17 It accords with the first principle cited above in that 
involuntary treatment is restricted to offenders who lack decision-making 
capacity and it must be in the person’s best interests. The second principle, 
however, is not fully recognised. An offender (or person found ‘unfit to plead’ 
or ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’) may be detained in a hospital or care home 
against their capacitous wishes, even though they cannot be treated if they 
have decision-making capacity and refuse the treatment. Detention may occur 
for an indeterminate period. For example, under a Public Protection Order 
(PPO) (s. 168) the person can be detained in an ‘appropriate establishment’ (a 
hospital or care home) if they have committed an imprisonable offence (other 
than those for which the sentence is fixed by law, i.e. murder) and if: they have 
an impairment of, or a disturbance in, the functioning of the mind or brain; 
appropriate care and treatment is available; releasing the person would create 
a risk, linked to the impairment of mind, of serious physical or psychological 
harm to others; and, depriving the person of their liberty is proportionate to 
the likelihood and seriousness of the risk. A ‘restriction condition’ may also be 
imposed with the PPO if the court is satisfied, having regard to all of the 
 
16  Szmukler G. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
‘Rights, will and preferences' in relation to mental health disabilities. Int J Law Psychiatry 
2017;54:90-97; Szmukler G. "Capacity", "best interests", "will and preferences" and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. World Psychiatry 2019;18:34-41 
17  Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nia/2016/18/contents/enacted 
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circumstances, and particularly the nature of the offence, the history of the 
offender and the risk of physical or psychological harm to the public, that 
restrictions are necessary for the protection of the public from serious physical 
or psychological harm. A PPO is of indeterminate duration; a restriction 
condition may be for a specified or unlimited period (until terminated when 
considered no longer necessary by the Department of Justice).18 
 
There are three countries that limit the length of a hospital order to no longer 
than a prison sentence for a similar offence – Italy, Croatia and Portugal, 
though in the case of the first, a conditional discharge may continue long 
beyond the custodial phase, and in the case of the last, the order may be 
extended by 2 years on multiple occasions. However, decision-making capacity 
is not a pre-requisite for involuntary treatment in any of those jurisdictions.  
 
What would be the implications for forensic practice if both anti-discrimination 
principles – first, equal respect for the autonomy of persons with a mental 
disorder compared to other patients, and second, management of offenders 
with a mental disorder on an equal basis with non-disordered offenders – were 
to be implemented? 
 
I shall restrict the discussion mainly to people who have committed a serious 
offence (or if not convicted because of a ‘mental condition’ defence, have 
nevertheless done an act or omission that would normally constitute a serious 
offence). Of greatest concern are serious violent or sexual offences. 
 
I shall first consider offenders with an impairment of mind who lack decision-
making capacity and those who retain decision-making capacity. I will then 
consider persons who are judged to be ‘unfit to plead’ (or to stand trial) and 
those judged ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’; in most jurisdictions 
imprisonment is ruled out in these situations since the person has not received 
a conviction. 
 
A further option that should be available for the court in all cases involving a 
person with a mental impairment is diversion to mental health services, under 
a civil involuntary treatment order. In such cases, the patient would fall outside 
the criminal justice system, with treatment and discharge decisions resting 
entirely with the clinician (or a civil mental health tribunal). This would be an 
option under a fusion law, but the criteria for an involuntary treatment order 
would now be based on decision-making capacity and best interests. Where a 
serious offence has been committed, however, the court is unlikely to adopt 




18 Campbell P, Rix K. Fusion legislation and forensic psychiatry: the criminal justice provisions 
of the Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016. Br J Psychiatry Advances 2018:24:195-
203. 
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V. OFFENDERS WITH AN IMPAIRMENT OF MIND WHO LACK DECISION-
MAKING CAPACITY 
 
Consider the case where a court has found the person guilty of the offence. It 
accepts further the evidence that the offender has an impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of mind, that he or she lacks treatment decision-
making capacity, and that treatment would be in the person’s best interests. 
Under a fusion law the person would thus meet the criteria for involuntary 
treatment. Transfer to a psychiatric hospital would thus be appropriate. 
 
However, I suggest that a number of other conditions should also apply to such 
a disposition. An order by the court could not impose a deprivation of liberty 
(or post-release restriction of liberty) that would last longer than that imposed 
by a sentence on a non-disordered offender convicted of a similar offence with 
a similar level of seriousness. An indeterminate hospital order would not be 
possible (unless, of course, the usual sentence was life imprisonment).  
 
Furthermore, if or when the person on an involuntary hospital order recovers 
decision-making capacity with an adequate degree of stability following 
treatment, the person would now be able to choose to continue with, or reject, 
further treatment. Continuing with treatment in hospital – if this were 
recommended by the clinician – would be as a voluntary patient. Treatment on 
this basis could be terminated by the patient at any time as long as they had 
decision-making capacity. If the patient, now with decision-making capacity, 
were to refuse treatment on a voluntary basis, there would be two management 
options. The first would be transfer to prison (this person having been convicted 
of the offence) until release was determined to be appropriate. The second 
would be discharge directly to the community under a form of supervision 
order. The decision to discharge the person to the community, whether from 
hospital or prison, would fall to a parole board (or other form of review board) 
that would have the necessary expert psychiatric membership. The aim would 
be, wherever possible, for the total duration of incarceration to be no longer 
than the usual custodial part of the sentence imposed on the non-disordered 
offender. 
 
What if the offender were to remain ill and still meet the criteria – decision-
making incapacity and best interests – for involuntary hospitalisation (or for a 
community treatment order) at the end of the court order related to their 
offence? At this point, the person would be managed under a civil order, and 
would now be outside the criminal justice system. 
 
Thus the total duration of the court order related to the offence - including the 
hospital, custodial and community supervision components - would be no 
longer than that imposed by the usual sentence on the non-disordered offender 
for a similar offence. For the person with a mental impairment who might make 
a rapid recovery in hospital, the deprivation of liberty element (in hospital or 
prison) might be substantially less than the usual custodial element in the case 
of the normal offender. The duration of the supervision order might also be 
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shorter. The parole board or tribunal would decide, having taken into account 
the risk of further violence. 
 
The nature of the supervision order that would apply following the person’s 
release from confinement under this proposed regime needs particular 
attention if it is to satisfy concerns about public protection. It must have 
adequate ‘teeth’. I propose that the supervision order will mandate regular 
reviews (probably with a social worker or probation officer with special 
expertise in mental health matters) and mandate a mental health assessment 
from an expert if the reviewing officer detects signs of relapse or indicators of 
a significant risk of reoffending. Other conditions may be imposed as occurs for 
non-disordered offenders on parole (e.g. prohibiting the individual from 
attending at a specified place; a restraining order where the necessary criteria 
are met). Supervision, however, should involve more than monitoring; it should 
be constructive, offering support, and help for engaging in health care, 
rehabilitation, education, training or employment programmes. Where 
appropriate, assistance could be offered with access to specialised supported 
accommodation (particularly helpful for some offenders with intellectual 
disabilities). Involuntary treatment would not be possible unless the person 
were to relapse, and again lose decision-making capacity, and treatment would 
be in their best interests. Otherwise treatment could only occur on a voluntary 
basis.  
 
A breach of the conditions of the supervision order in the absence of reasonable 
mitigation could result in recall to the court. If the person retains decision-
making capacity and refuses voluntary treatment, the court could impose a 
range of penalties, including a curfew, with or without an electronic tag, and 
up to a custodial disposal. The processes would be similar to those for a breach 
of parole conditions or could mirror existing penalties for breaches of protective 
orders, as exist, for example, with regard to breach of a restraining order under 
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or a Sexual Harm Prevention Order 
under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A supervision order could not extend in 
the context considered here beyond the period stipulated in the court order 
made at sentencing (or longer than the sentence for a comparator non-
disordered offender). 
 
It would be necessary that the offender have the capacity to understand the 
terms of the supervision order for it to be an option. The proposal has much in 
common with the Law Commission’s proposed supervision orders for those 




19  Law Commission. Unfitness to Plead. Volume 1: Report. 2016 Law Com No 364. 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk; Mental health and fair trial: A report by JUSTICE. 2017. 
www.justice.org.uk 
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What if the offender were assessed by the court to present a serious risk to 
others that would be likely to outlast the usual term of a sentence for the 
offence? A restriction order of indeterminate duration specifically for offenders 
with a mental disorder would be discriminatory and thus no longer available. 
However, a non-discriminatory solution exists. In England, for example, 
‘extended sentences’ are available for non-disordered offenders who are 
assessed as presenting a risk to others that is likely to persist beyond the term 
of a usual sentence. Depending on the nature of the index offence and specified 
previous offences as set out in a schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the 
extension may be for up to 5 years or 8 years depending on the index offence. 
A discretionary life sentence may also be imposed by the court where the 
offender is assessed as dangerous and the offence itself justifies a life sentence, 
or where the defendant is convicted of a serious specified offence and has a 
previous conviction for such an offence. An extended court order could be 
imposed on an offender with an impairment of mind based on the same criteria. 
This form of preventive detention is established at the sentencing stage. 
Attention would need to be given to the possible intrusion here of a form of 
indirect discrimination. Persons with a mental illness may be more likely judged 
to pose an ongoing risk, simply because they have such an illness. Evidence 
would thus be required concerning the precise nature of the risk, its relationship 
to the mental illness, how exactly the risk might unfold and how the sentence 
is proportionate to the risk. 
 
VI. OFFENDERS WITH AN IMPAIRMENT OF MIND WHO RETAIN DECISION-
MAKING CAPACITY 
 
What if the court has found the person guilty of the offence, it accepts the 
evidence that the offender has an impairment or disturbance in the functioning 
of mind but finds that he or she retains treatment decision-making capacity? 
Under a fusion law the person would not meet the criteria for involuntary 
treatment. Transfer to a psychiatric hospital would then only be possible if the 
offender accepted treatment on a voluntary basis. If such treatment were 
refused, or having commenced the patient decided no longer to continue, then 
the person would go to prison. If there is a treatment that would benefit the 
person, the option of treatment should be retained so that the person could be 
transferred to a hospital as a voluntary patient if they were to change their 
mind. 
 
Discharge from voluntary hospitalisation to the community or release from 
prison to the community would be with the authorisation of the parole or review 
board as for offenders who have a period of involuntary treatment in hospital. 
Supervision orders would involve the same range of conditions as described 
above. Again, the total duration of the deprivation of liberty (in custody or 
hospital or both) plus restriction of liberty in the community (on a supervision 
order) must be no longer than the sentence incurred by a non-disordered 
offender who has committed a similar offence with a similar degree of 
seriousness. Extended sentences would be available as described above. 
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Engagement in treatment on a voluntary basis may increase the likelihood of 
an earlier release or discharge into the community. If this were being cynically 
used by an offender with the aim of obtaining earlier release from detention, 
one hopes that this would become evident in the way the person engages, or 
fails to engage, in the treatment. In any case the person would still be under a 
supervision order in the community for the remainder of the sentence and be 
required to have a mental health assessment if there were indications of 
increasing risk.  
 
VII. THE ‘MENTAL CONDITION’ OR ‘SPECIAL’ DEFENCES 
 
A. The problem 
 
Persons judged to be ‘unfit to plead’ (or unfit to stand trial) or ‘not guilty by 
reason of insanity’ (or another form of insanity defence) may present special 
problems in respect of their disposal by the court. As culpability is absent in the 
case of the person not guilty by reason of insanity, or not able to be fully 
established in the case of unfitness to plead, a conviction is excluded, and a 
custodial sentence is ruled out. Currently, the usual disposal when the options 
of a discharge or supervision order are regarded as inadequate is a hospital 
order that may be of indeterminate duration. The purpose of the hospital order 
is to provide treatment, but equally, though arguably less explicitly, to protect 
the public. The two elements are somewhat obscured in the hospital order. 
Whether the person has or does not have treatment decision-making capacity 
at the time of the court hearing is immaterial as to whether a hospital order 
can be made.  
 
Under a fusion law, involuntary treatment would only be possible for a person 
with a mental impairment if the decision-making capacity and best interests 
criteria were met. While this would be the case in many - perhaps the majority 
of cases - where a mental condition defence were accepted, it is likely there 
will be cases where the person has decision-making capacity at the time of the 
hearing and would thus not be eligible for an involuntary treatment order. For 
example, sufficient time may have elapsed between the act or omission and 
the court hearing for a defendant judged not guilty by reason of insanity to 
have regained decision-making capacity, perhaps following treatment during 
the period on remand. Or in the case of unfitness to plead, the criteria for 
unfitness may not map well on to those determining an impaired decision-
making capacity for treatment. Colleagues suggest that such cases are likely to 
be rare; there is a commonly held view that the threshold for unfitness to plead 
is higher than the civil threshold for decision-making incapacity 
 
Thus, where the defendant is judged to be unfit to plead or not guilty by reason 
of insanity and i. has been found to have done the act or omission, and ii. he 
or she lacks decision-making capacity and treatment for a mental impairment 
is in the person’s best interests, an involuntary treatment order would be 
justified under a fusion law. Such treatment would need to be continued on a 
voluntary basis following a recovery of decision-making capacity, or if refused, 
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treatment would end. But what would be the options available to the court 
when the defendant is judged to be unfit to plead or not guilty by reason of 
insanity, has decision-making capacity but rejects the offer of treatment, yet is 
assessed as presenting a substantial risk to others? Or what if on a stable 
recovery of decision-making capacity, when involuntary treatment must cease, 
the person subject to such an order rejects further treatment on a voluntary 
basis yet is assessed as presenting a continuing substantial risk to others?  
 
If there were some form of generic dangerousness legislation that allowed the 
preventive detention of any person - irrespective of whether they had a ‘mental 
disorder’ or not – assessed by a court as presenting an unacceptable risk to 
others, even if not convicted of an offence, the problem could be solved. (As 
would the discrimination against persons with a mental disorder who are 
singularly liable under current mental health laws to be detained if deemed to 
present a risk to others, even if they have not committed an offence). Such 
legislation is unlikely to be adopted. It would also probably be in breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Another argument might be founded on the exceptional position of those 
judged to be unfit to plead or not guilty by reason of insanity. Despite having 
perhaps done an act of great seriousness, such as a homicide, they are not 
held culpable, and thus cannot be detained even if assessed as presenting a 
substantial risk to others (unless, for a period at least, they meet the criteria 
for involuntary treatment). One could claim that this exceptional group of 
persons merits exceptional measures. In the absence of any acceptable 
alternative, it could be argued that they might be detained on a hospital order 
on the basis of the risk they are deemed to pose. Further conditions might be 
attached: that the risk to others is serious, there is a causal nexus with an 
impairment of mind, and that there is a treatment for the condition that will 
significantly reduce the likelihood of future violence. The question of a time 
limit on the order would need to be addressed. 
 
Or one might do away with the ‘mental condition’ defences altogether. Zero 
culpability on the basis of a mental impairment, as in the case of a person 
deemed ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’, might be regarded as a fiction. After 
all, the vast majority of persons with a serious mental illness, especially in the 
absence of drug or alcohol misuse, do not commit serious acts of violence. If 
there always remained an element of culpability, even if low, a conviction would 
then be possible, especially if another element in determining the seriousness 
of an offence - the harm caused - were high. Detention in an appropriate 
establishment - not necessarily a prison but a place more supportive for a 
person with a mental impairment - would then be possible. Treatment would 
need to be on a voluntary basis for the person with decision-making capacity. 
The maximum duration of the detention would be commensurate with the 
sentence imposed on a non-disordered offender who has committed a similar 
offence of a similar degree of seriousness. The low culpability might be taken 
to mean that the major contribution to the level of seriousness would be the 
harm entailed in the index offence.  




There are indeed a few jurisdictions where the insanity defence has been 
abolished. Sweden is a notable example. However, the court can sentence the 
offender with a ‘severe mental disorder’ to indefinite detention in a forensic 
facility and allow compulsory treatment. The deprivation of liberty of the person 
detained in a forensic unit may, as elsewhere, far exceed in its duration the 
sentence that would be imposed on a non-disordered offender for the same 
offence. There is at present a strong movement for reform; criticisms surround 
the way in which various interests are blurred: the need for treatment, 
principles of criminal responsibility and public protection. 20  A recent 
governmental committee has proposed the reintroduction of a criminal 
responsibility element with an acquittal if the person is found unaccountable. 
However, it is proposed that a form of declaratory judgment would be made, 
and this could entail a number of ‘public protection measures’, including 
incarceration, involuntary treatment, restraint orders, residency requirements, 
or prohibitions on drug or alcohol use. These measures would be reviewed six-
monthly and with no fixed term overall. While the criminal responsibility 
element has received support, the ‘protective measures’ have been the subject 
of criticism. Proportionality is again an issue here: those with a mental 
impairment may suffer longer restrictions on their liberty than other offenders. 
 
The abolition of the mental state defences is also claimed to be necessary for 
compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(UN CRPD).21 Such defences are deemed to be discriminatory as they limit 
persons with disabilities’ legal capacity on the basis of their having a disability. 
Instead it is claimed that support measures or special accommodations are 
required to make the normal procedures of law accessible to those with 
disabilities on an equal basis with others. It is further argued by the UN CRPD 
Committee that an impairment of ‘mental capacity’ is not a justification for an 
interference with legal capacity. Despite statements such as the following from 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: 22 ‘… disability-neutral 
doctrines on the subjective element of the crime should be applied, which take 
into consideration the situation of the individual defendant’ - a detailed account 
of how accommodations to legal procedures would operate were these changes 
to be introduced has yet to be provided, certainly one that has attracted a 
reasonable degree of wider support.23  
 
20 Gooding P, Bennet T. The Abolition of the Insanity Defence in Sweden and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Human Rights Brinksmanship or Evidence 
It Won’t Work? New Criminal Law Rev 2018;21:141-169 
21  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Guidelines on article 14 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted during the Committee’s 14th 
session, held in September 2015. 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/14thsession/GuidelinesOnArticle14.doc 
22  Annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the General Assembly. 
A/HRC/10/49, presented 26 January 2009, para 48-9. 
23 Peay J. Mental incapacity and criminal liability: redrawing the fault lines? Int J Law Psychiatry 
2015;40:25-35; Gooding P, O’Mahoney C. Laws on unfitness to stand trial and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Comparing reform in England, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and Australia. Int J Law, Crime and Justice 2016;44:122-145 




The fullest schema thus far is probably that suggested by Slobogin. 24 He 
proposes that the mental condition defences be dropped, and that culpability 
on conviction be determined by the court on the basis of the subjective mental 
state of the mentally ill defendant, in the same way as it is for other defendants. 
The degree of mitigation would depend, for example, on whether the person 
believed circumstances existed, that if true, would have justified the offending 
act, for example, by amounting to duress. However, he also supports a 
preventive detention measure, though strictly limited to persons who pose a 
significant risk of unjustifiable serious bodily harm to another, but who are 
presently, like those not guilty by reason of insanity, not subject to criminal 
jurisdiction. This would require proof, he proposes, that such a person: (a) 
believes such harm is not criminal (for some with serious mental illness or 
enemy combatants); or (b) is powerless to prevent the harm (as with 
‘automatisms’ or with contagious diseases) or (c) is willing to cause such harm 
even if punishment, death or serious bodily injury to the actor is highly likely 
(as with some terrorists). So far, the schema, if applied generically to all in a 
‘disability-neutral’ fashion, might be seen as compliant with the CRPD. 
However, the third element in the schema, ‘protective’ of the person’s 
competence to make decisions or autonomous choices, might be seen as not. 
Competence is to be determined by a ‘basic rationality and basic self-regard’ 
test. This would require the person to have a ‘minimal’ understanding of the 
risks and benefits of the choice to be made, an ability to give reasons not based 
on demonstrably erroneous facts, and an effort to consider these and other 
reasons for self-preservation. Peay25 discusses the ‘esoteric’ questions that may 
arise in attempts to apply the ‘subjective element’ in a criminal act to people 
with a serious mental illness, such as one involving delusional ideas. For 
example, what is to be the definition of, or weight to be attached to, a 
perpetrator’s ‘reasonable’ or ‘honest’ belief concerning the circumstances of an 
offending act if the act is based on an ‘irrational’ delusional belief? 
 
However, a powerful argument against an abolition of the not guilty by reason 
of insanity verdict is the centuries-old moral principle in the law that a person 
who is not criminally responsible for an act should not be punished for it. 
 
B. Management under a fusion law 
 
Returning to, and accepting the conventional current situation where a verdict 
of not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead is adopted, how would a 
fusion law, strictly observed, play out?  
 
Let us first consider a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. A trial has shown 
that the act or omission was done. A prison sentence is not possible as there is 
 
24 Slobogin C. Eliminating mental disability as a legal criterion in deprivation of liberty cases: 
the impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability on the insanity defense, 
civil commitment, and competency law. Int J Law Psychiatry 2015;40:36-42. 
25 Supra Note 20 
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no conviction. The options would be: i. acquittal and discharge; ii. a supervision 
order; iii. treatment on a voluntary basis if the person has decision-making 
capacity; iv. involuntary treatment on a hospital order if the person lacks 
decision-making capacity and treatment is in his or her best interests. When 
decision-making capacity is regained, treatment could only be continued on a 
voluntary basis, otherwise the person would be discharged from hospital. Some 
options may be combined sequentially, for example, voluntary treatment and a 
supervision order. 
 
As noted earlier for those with a mental impairment who have been convicted, 
the supervision order must have ‘teeth’. Such an order would only be imposed 
where the person was assessed on the best available evidence as presenting a 
substantial risk of serious harm to others. Mandatory reviews would be 
required, as well as a mandatory mental health assessment if there were 
evidence of relapse of an illness that has been associated previously with 
serious harm to others. Other conditions could also be imposed as described 
earlier for supervision orders (e.g. a restraining order). Again, supervision 
should be constructive, offering support, and help for accessing suitable 
programmes, and where it might be helpful, specialised supported 
accommodation. Involuntary treatment would not be possible unless the person 
were to relapse, again associated with a loss of decision-making capacity and 
with the treatment being in the person’s best interests. Otherwise treatment 
could only occur on a voluntary basis. A breach of the supervision order would 
be reported to the court and might, depending on the circumstances, constitute 
a separate offence. If so, punishment would include a possible custodial 
sentence. As noted above, a breach of a supervision order under the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997, an order that can be made even if the person is 
not convicted, carries a range of penalties up to a custodial sentence of 5 years. 
The Law Commission examined the arguments concerning the moral case for 
and against creating a related offence for persons found not guilty of the index 
offence.26 It concluded that where a person poses a significant risk of harm, 
having no sanction to ensure compliance with a supervision order would 
undermine public confidence in the court system. As stated earlier, the 
assessment of risk would need to be as transparent and objective as possible. 
 
The total duration of an order could be no longer than the sentence passed on 
a non-disordered offender who had committed a similar offence, of a similar 
degree of seriousness. At the end of this period, if the criteria for involuntary 
treatment were still met, only a civil order could be imposed. As in the case of 
convicted mentally impaired persons, an extended order could be imposed by 
the court according to the same criteria as apply to non-disordered offenders. 
The only difference would be the absence of a conviction for the index act or 
omission, but commission of the act has nevertheless been established by trial. 
The history of prior offences (including acts or omissions where the person was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity) would parallel those of the non-
 
26  Law Commission. Unfitness to Plead. Volume 1: Report. 2016 Law Com No 364. 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk 
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disordered offender subject to an extended sentence. The key issue here is one 
of risk, not culpability. 
 
In the case of a ruling that the person is ‘unfit to plead’, the same options as 
for not guilty by reason of insanity would apply. The court, however, could 
stipulate a period within which a restoration of the capacity to stand trial would 




Concerns about the adequacy of measures to protect the public from offenders 
with a mental disorder have been frequently raised as an argument against the 
feasibility of a fusion law (and in key respects, of a ‘capacity-based’ mental 
health law). I have sketched out the possible implications of such law for 
forensic provisions. Two key forms of discrimination against persons with a 
mental impairment (including, but not restricted to, so-called ‘mentally 
disordered’ offenders) need to be avoided. The first is that arising from the 
treatment of persons with a mental illness when compared to all other patient 
groups; the second is that arising from the treatment of an offender with a 
mental impairment when compared with non-disordered offenders. Eliminating 
the first form requires that patients’ autonomy is equally respected. Eliminating 
the second form of discrimination requires that the total period of a deprivation 
of liberty and restriction of liberty must not exceed in duration that entailed in 
the sentence imposed on a non-disordered offender convicted of a similar crime 
having a similar level of seriousness. 
 
The management of convicted offenders with a mental impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of mind would in some respects parallel that 
imposed on non-disordered offenders, especially in terms of comparable 
periods of deprivation and restriction of liberty. The differences would be in 
periods of inpatient treatment, voluntary or involuntary, and a form of post-
discharge supervision which, despite resembling probation, would however 
have a stronger therapeutic and supportive emphasis. Extended sentences 
would be available on the same basis as for non-disordered offenders. 
 
Some colleagues voice concerns about the unsuitability of a prison environment 
for people with a mental disorder, even if they have decision-making capacity 
yet refuse hospital treatment. This view should be taken seriously and presents 
a strong argument for making ‘reasonable accommodations’ in prison for people 
with disabilities, including mental health disabilities, especially as their numbers 
would likely increase with a concomitant decrease of those in secure hospitals. 
 
The ‘mental condition’ defences, the insanity defence and unfitness to plead, 
present a special problem in terms of management. Imprisonment is ruled out 
since the person is not convicted. The difficulty arises when the person has 
done an act - and perhaps previous acts - that suggest the person poses a 
substantial risk to others. Under a fusion law, the conventional recourse to a 
hospital order would only be available if the person lacked decision-making 
[2020] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
 
 51 
capacity and treatment was in their best interests. For the person with decision-
making capacity, treatment if considered appropriate, could only occur on a 
voluntary basis.  
 
One possible solution to the problem posed by a person who presents a serious 
risk, retains decision-making capacity, and refuses treatment is to see the 
position of such a person - in a kind of ‘no-man’s land’ between the criminal 
justice system and the healthcare system - as exceptional. One might then 
argue that a hospital treatment order might be made even if capacity is 
preserved. The avoidance of discrimination would require at least that the 
maximum term of such an order should be no longer than the sentence 
normally imposed for a similar offence with a similar level of seriousness. 
However, satisfactory public protection may be achieved in a non-
discriminatory manner within the parameters of a fusion law by making use of 
hospital treatment, voluntary or involuntary depending on the person’s 
decision-making capacity, and a form of supervision order in the community 
that is supportively structured, but includes conditions to ensure compliance.  
 
 
 
